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Abstract 
The knowledge produced by academic scientists has been identified as a potential 
key driver of technological progress. Recent policies in Europe aim at increasing 
commercially orientated activities in academe. Based on a sample of German 
scientists across all fields of science we investigate the importance of academic 
patenting. Our findings suggest that academic involvement in patenting results in 
greater knowledge externalities, as academic patents appear to generate more 
forward citations. We also find that in the European context of changing research 
objectives and funding sources since the mid-90’s, the “importance” of academic 
patents declines over time. We show that academic entrants have patents of lower 
“quality” than academic incumbents but they did not cause the decline, since the 
relative importance of patents involving academics with an existing patenting 
history declined over time as well. Moreover, a preliminary evaluation of the 
effects of the abolishment of the “professor privilege” (the German counterpart of 
the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act) reveals that this legal disposition led to an acceleration of 
this apparent decline. 
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1 Introduction 
Assessing the economic impact of public science has been discussed among economic 
scholars, professionals and policy makers since decades. The most obvious 
contribution of public science towards economic growth is the education of the future 
high-skilled labor force. Possibly equally important, however, is the fact that public 
science provides research results for the public domain, and their insights can be 
picked up by the business sector so that research results from public institutions can 
be translated into new production processes and products. Third, more active ways to 
promote the knowledge and technology transfer from academe to industry are, among 
other channels, collaborations in R&D projects, faculty consulting, spin-off creation 
by universities, university patenting and licensing of technologies. Those activities are 
typically summarized as industry-science interactions.  
Several scholars have shown positive economic benefits of research results produced 
in public science. For instance, Jaffe (1989) has shown that university research 
contributes to state-level corporate patenting. Adams (1990) found that cumulative 
stocks of academic research stimulate productivity growth in industry. Lichtenberg 
(1996, 2001, 2003) links pharmaceutical innovation to lower hospital costs and 
increased life expectancy, and Toole (2007) concludes that university research makes 
significant contribution to drug innovation in pharmaceutical industry. Mansfield 
(1991) concludes from a survey of 76 US firms that 11% of product inventions and 
9% of process inventions would not have been made in the absence of recent 
academic research. This picture is supported by the Yale survey and the Carnegy 
Mellon survey. Both surveys have shown that universities deliver a significant impact 
for new product and process development in firms (Cohen et al., 2002). Further 
studies have shown that academic scientists significantly contributed to the birth of 
the U.S. biotechnology industry (Zucker and Darby, 1996, Zucker et al., 1998), and 
that academic scientists significantly contribute to firm performance when they 
venture from academe to industry (Zucker et al., 2002, Toole and Czarnitzki, 2007, 
2008).  
On the background of the ongoing transformation of economies towards “modern 
knowledge societies”, many governments increased their attention towards industry-
science interactions, and, hence, those have been the subject of innovation policy in 
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most industrialized countries recently. Such policies aim at increasing industry-
science interactions in the future as it is assumed that an increased attitude towards 
commercialization in public science will result in even higher economic benefits. 
Despite the presumably positive effect of increased commercialization of academic 
inventions on technological progress, there are some serious threats. Most important 
is the peril of the “culture of open science” at universities through a shift in content of 
academic research from basic to applied research that focuses on subsequent 
commercialization (Verspagen, 2006). Many scholars see the relatively open nature of 
science progress at universities, which is characterized by sharing of knowledge, data 
and research results as opposed to corporate research and development, as a key 
determinant of the success of university research (Dasgupta and David, 1994).  
These controversial arguments gave rise to several studies on the commercialization 
of academic research in response to policy changes. Among other policies, the most 
prominent or most studied example is the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act from 1980. The Bayh-
Dole Act strengthened the patenting rights of US universities (and small businesses) 
by granting them the right to patent and to retain the ownership of inventions even if 
these were financed through public resources. Examples of studies on the potential 
effects of the Bayh-Dole Act are Henderson et al. (1998), Mowery and Ziedonis 
(2002), Mowery et al. (2002), and Sampat et al. (2003). 
While most of the literature on the quality of academic commercialization is based on 
the Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S., little attention has been paid to the commercial value 
of science more generally. We exploit institutional differences between the U.S. and 
Europe, and suggest that even without a Bayh-Dole Act, the increasing orientation 
towards commercialization results in diminishing quality of academic 
commercialization. We argue that declining public budgets for Higher Education 
R&D and increased policy orientation towards technology transfer result in more 
industry-science interactions. However, as can be expected from neoclassical theory, 
more commercialization activities are subject to decreasing marginal returns. 
We use patent data on German professors as we are able to identify individual 
academic inventors. Unlike most other studies for the U.S., we do not rely on 
assigneeship of a university, as academics may also collaborate with industry without 
university involvement. Our results show that “professor patents” are, on average, 
more valuable than a corporate patent without faculty involvement. However, we 
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observe a stark decline of quality over time. First, the quality of corporate and 
academic patents converge, but in the most recent period in our data, academic quality 
even falls behind corporate quality. Interestingly, this last period corresponds to the 
introduction of a Bayh-Dole-type policy in Germany. In further steps, we show that 
academic entrants that enter commercialization channels possibly due to budget 
constraints in the public sector account for a larger share of the decline than do 
experienced inventors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: first we outline the literature and 
our hypotheses to be tested. The third section presents the construction of the 
database, and some descriptive evidence. Section 4 presents econometric evidence 
from count data models. The final section concludes and suggests further research on 
the topic. 
2 Commercializing Academic Research 
2.1 The difference between public and private research 
Public sector science in form of discoveries and inventions produced at universities or 
other public research institutions has some features that distinguish it from research 
financed and produced in the business sector. Typically, public knowledge production 
happens in an open regime that facilitates disclosure and diffusion of inventions and 
discoveries (Dasgupta and David, 1994). Science has priority over commercialization 
of inventions and the incentives for inventors are significantly determined by peer 
recognition and career rewards such as tenure, and not only by monetary rewards 
(Merton, 1973).1 This incentive structure strongly supports the openness of public 
science and leverages effective cumulative innovation through a sharing of 
knowledge, data and research results. In contrast, science produced in the private 
sector aims at commercialization and the profit from an invention largely depends on 
the degree to which others can be excluded (Arrow, 1962).  
As the focus of private science is often on short and medium-term profits from 
inventions, the private sector is likely to systematically “underfund” inventions that 
are rather basic in nature (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002). As opposed to applied 
                                                 
1 This is strongly supported by a recent survey among European inventors (Giuri et al., 2007). 
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inventions that are strongly linked to their commercial success basic inventions and 
the results of fundamental research are more difficult to appropriate, especially in the 
short run. This is one of the main arguments for publicly sponsored science. A 
systematic difference in the nature of public and private science has been empirically 
approved (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). A related argument for public science is that 
fundamental research might have much broader applications, i.e. their social value 
should be higher than that of private science. Hence, the “shoulders” of inventions 
and discoveries produced at universities are supposed to be much broader than those 
of private inventions. Beyond break-through inventions and industry-science 
collaborations, publicly sponsored science at universities provides codified ways of 
solving problems that can be useful beyond a specific content and universities borders 
(Dasgupta and David, 1994). Further, public science provides a structured picture of 
interdependencies in science, which can help uncovering the relevant technology 
areas of a particular problem. This can save research efforts as it can help avoiding 
unnecessary (costly and time consuming) experiments and maximize the probability 
of discovery (Fleming and Sorensen, 2004).  
These distinctive features of public science suggest a significant contribution to 
technological progress and growth: the basicness of university science increases the 
potential for its use and the open culture at universities positively affects the diffusion 
of research results. Griliches (1984) and Adams (1990) document a significant 
contribution of university research and science produced at public research centres to 
economic growth in their seminal studies. 
On top of that there are arguments that support that the knowledge produced in the 
public science sector should even exceed private sector knowledge. For instance, in 
order to justify publicly financed science, we should see that discoveries made in the 
public sector have a higher social value than inventions produced by the private sector 
(Agrawal and Henderson, 2002).   
What happens if academic scientists engage in commercialization, though? While we 
expect that academic inventions will be socially more valuable, it does not necessarily 
imply that the private value is also high. However, in the case of spin-off creation or 
patenting, for example, we can follow the logic of a theoretical model of Lacetera 
(2008). Suppose an industrial research and an academic scientist face the same time 
constraint for their activity (e.g. 12 working hours per day), and suppose both have 
  5
certain ideas for research projects. The industrial researcher would start a project if 
the expected profits are larger than zero. The academic scientist, however, has to 
decide to which extent he or she splits the time between academic tasks, e.g. 
publications, and commercial tasks. Thus, the academic has opportunity cost of 
foregone academic merits if he or she decides to engage in commercialization. The 
academic scientist would only self-select into commercialization if the expected 
utility gain, that is, monetary profits, is larger than the lost utility of non-published 
papers due to time constraints. Hence, we can still conclude that academic patents, for 
instance, should be more valuable than private sector patents due to the incurred 
positive opportunity cost for the academic scientist which induces a self-selection into 
commercialization.2 
Taking these different arguments together, we arrive at a first hypothesis which will 
be tested with patent data: 
• Hypothesis 1:   
Faculty involvement in the commercialization of inventions should, on 
average, lead to higher quality than inventions produced by non-academics.  
Furthermore, we will also test if academic inventors are more likely to produce break-
through inventions. While one expects that the average quality is higher, it can also be 
expected that block-buster patents are produced in academe, as they may require 
highly complex processes and approaches. Academics who are usually assumed to be 
at the forefront of research in their field may have a comparative advantage over 
industrial researchers, as they, for instance, shape their human capital within a small 
group of initial discoverers of new technology field. See Zucker et al. (1998) for the 
example of academic discoveries in the biotechnology sector and how their 
commercialization activities linked to a few star scientists led to a diffusion of 
knowledge that is nowadays commonly used in the U.S. or to a large extent even in 
the global biotechnology industry.  
                                                 
2 Lacetera (2008) originally built his model to argue that studies comparing academic spin-off 
performance with other newly founded firms are suffering from such self-selection bias. Researchers 
typically found that academic spin-offs perform better, but Lacetera argues that this is a self-selection 
effect than rather superior average performance in the population of academics. 
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• Hypothesis 2:   
Faculty involvement in the commercialization of inventions does not only lead 
to higher quality, on average, but faculty patents are especially more valuable 
in the upper tail of the quality distribution of inventions.  
2.2 Public budgets and implications for public research 
The recent past has seen significant changes in the European public science sector. 
First of all, public budgets spent on science and technology decreased significantly all 
over Europe (Geuna and Nesta, 2006). Figure 1 shows the development of higher 
education R&D expenditures (HERD) in Germany and the united States over the past 
decades. The solid line shows that the investment in higher education is almost 
constant over time in terms of GDP in Germany at about 0.4%. In the United States, 
HERD/GDP grew over time, but is still below 0.4% in the mid 2000s. In contrast, the 
share of HERD financed by the business sector increased significantly in Germany. It 
rose from a share of about 2% in 1981 to 14% in 2005. Thus the contribution of 
private funding sources gradually substituted public funding sources. Interestingly, we 
do not see such a trend in the United States. The share of HERD financed by the 
business sector peaks at about 8% at the end of the nineties, but declines to about 4% 
by 2005. 
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Figure 1: Higher education R&D expenditure over time 
Germany 
United States 
Source: OECD – Main Science and Technology Indicators; own calculations. 
Furthermore, in the presence of public budget constraints the structure of public 
financing of research changed towards competitive funds (Geuna, 2001). Examples 
are the “elite university” in Germany, where universities compete against each other 
for “elite” funding by the government.  
The decreasing public funding forced universities to more and more reach out for 
different sources of financing (Geuna and Nesta, 2006). Besides an increased 
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financing by non-profit organizations, most of the funding gap was bridged through 
increased collaborations with the private sector (Geuna, 2001). The increased 
dependence on industry funds might have significant consequences for academic 
research. On the one hand, close links between academia and industry have many 
positive aspects not only for the business partner (e.g. Zucker and Darby, 2000, Hall 
et al., 2001) but also for the academic sector, as for instance the realization of 
complementarities between applied and basic research (Azoulay et al., 2006) and the 
generation of new research ideas (Rosenberg, 1998). However, there are also some 
potential negative implications. Most serious, the content of academic research might 
shift from rather basic to applied inventions that aim at immediate commercialization 
(Azoulay et al., 2006), which would have negative implications for long-term 
fundamental research. A shift in content towards commercialization would partly 
explain the increased engagement of academics in patenting that was documented by 
a number of scholars for different European countries (Meyer et al., 2003, Lissoni et 
al., 2006, Czarnitzki et al., 2007a, 2007b).3  
However, scientists face an increasing pressure to patent from changing rules in the 
public science sector. The competition for funding from the government is not based 
on scientific publications only but also evaluates the scientists or the university 
department in terms of their patent outcome. Furthermore, career rewards as tenure 
are increasingly dependent on patents and industry-science collaboration rather than 
on scientific publications only. These developments gradually changed the incentive 
structure for scientists and put them under increased pressure to transfer their 
knowledge into marketable products.  
                                                 
3 Another important threat concerns the number and the quality of scientific publications. Geuna and 
Nesta (2006) survey the existing literature for Europe on the effect of increased patenting on 
publication outcome. Most of the studies for Europe find no empirical evidence for university patenting 
to reduce the number of scientific publications or their quality (e.g. Czarnitzki et al. 2007a, for 
Germany, Breschi et al., 2006, for Italy). For the US, the results are similar (e.g. Stephan et al., 2006, 
Azoulay et al., 2006, Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2005). Distinguishing between university and corporate 
patents of professors in Germany, Czarnitzki et al. (2007b) conclude that corporate patenting by 
academics has a negative impact on their scientific performance, while patents in collaboration with 
nor-profit organizations spur their publication outcome and quality . 
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Extending Lacetera’s (2008) and Jensen et al.’s (2007) arguments, suppose that an 
academic scientist has the opportunity to complete either an economically valuable 
project or to do basic science in each of two periods. The scientist can do pre-
commercial research in the first period and use this new knowledge to engage in 
commercial activity in the second period. Alternatively, the scientist can engage in 
commercial activity right away, building on his current stock of knowledge solely. In 
the first scenario, the scientist applies his new research results to innovate. In the 
second scenario, the scientist will innovate, based on the current state of knowledge. 
Therefore, the quality of these innovations will differ substantially, as the innovation 
based on novel scientific achievements will have a higher value than the innovation 
based on existing knowledge. Due to the increased pressure to patent they face, 
scientists will therefore be more likely to shift toward immediate commercialization 
without performing pre-commercial research, which will result in innovations of 
lower quality. 
In addition, incentives for the corporate sector to collaborate with academia have also 
evolved. Many European governments, as well as the European Commission, have 
launched several public programs to promote and strengthen industry-science links, 
by financially supporting collaboration between academia and the private sector 
(Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005). There is ample evidence that these financial 
incentives increase the propensity of firms of engaging in cooperative agreements 
with academia in order to benefit from government-sponsored cost sharing of 
innovation (Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005, Capron and Cincera, 2003, Mohnen and 
Hoareau, 2003).  
Figure 2 shows some evidence from German subsidy data taken from the PROFI 
database. The graph shows annual statistics of civilian “direct project funding” of the 
German Federal Government. The “direct project funding” is the most important 
project-orientated policy instrument for funding R&D projects in Germany. 
Applicants for public R&D money can submit proposals which are evaluated 
according to technological feasibility and expected economic returns. An application 
may either be filed by a single firm or research institution, or by a research 
consortium of firms and/or research institutions. The upper chart shows that grants 
given out to consortia rather than single firms or institutions oscillates around 40% of 
total grants in the 2000s. The lower graph clearly shows the change of policy in 
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Germany. Within several sub-programs of the “direct project funding” the German 
Government promoted industry-science interactions. This becomes evident when we 
separate the collaborative research grants by type of consortium. Since the mid 1980s, 
we find a clear trend towards promoting industry-science consortia, while there is 
little growth of grants given to pure firm research consortia or pure science consortia. 
Figure 2: Civilian mission-orientated research funding by German Federal Government 
Share of collaborative research grants in terms of total amount granted within 
mission-orientated research funding in Germany 
 
Division of collaborative research grants by type of research consortia 
 
Source: PROFI database from Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research;  
own calculations. 
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However, cooperation with academia requires a critical level of prior knowledge or 
“absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) to effectively recognize, 
assimilate and utilize external information flows stemming from academia, which are 
by nature more basic. This suggests that the growing public support of cooperative 
agreements between the private sector and academia led many firms that do not have 
this critical level of internal knowledge to engage in partnerships with academia.   
Thus, we arrive at our third hypothesis on a possible decline of patent quality.  
• Hypothesis 3:   
The quality of faculty patents declines with the increasing shift towards 
commercialization in academe (compared to a control group of corporate 
patents). 
Mowery et al. (2006) find that in the US, inexperienced universities initially adopted 
an indiscriminate policy toward patenting as they entered into this activity after 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act and patented inventions with little evaluation of the 
market within their industry. Furthermore, they find that the decline quality of 
university patents in the U.S. is largely due to these academic entrants. Provided 
Hypothesis 3 is fulfilled, the decline in quality of faculty patents might as well be 
driven by academic entrants. Therefore we will test whether the decrease in quality of 
faculty patents should be attributed to academics with no historical experience in 
patenting, or if there is a more secular decline. 
We argue that even if academic entrants patent inventions of lower importance than 
academic incumbents, they are not causing the decline, since the new “research 
culture” induced by the changing objectives and funding sources affect all potential 
academic inventor. 
•  Hypothesis 4:   
Academic entrants have patents of lower quality than academic incumbents, 
but they do not drive the decline in quality. 
2.3 The abolishment of the professor’s privilege in Germany 
As outlined above, the shift to entrepreneurial universities (Etzkowitz et al., 2000) 
may reduce the difference between academic and industrial research due to an 
orientation towards commercialization in public science. Studies for the U.S. that 
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have investigated the consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act find mixed evidence on this 
hypothesis (among others, Henderson et al., 1998, Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002, 
Mowery et al., 2002, and Sampat et al., 2003). Researchers have studied patent 
quality before and after the Act in 1980. However, the after-Bayh-Dole Act phase was 
also characterized by a general trend towards the entrepreneurial university in the U.S. 
that cannot be purely attributed to strengthening universities’ patent rights. For 
instance, it can also be observed that the number of spin-off companies is constantly 
growing in the U.S., from about 200 in the mid 1990s per year to about 400 in the 
early 2000s (Source: AUTM U.S. Licensing Survey: FY 2004). 
We make use of institutional differences between the U.S. and Germany to uncover 
differences of the generally increasing commercialization trend and the impact of a 
Bayh-Dole Act-type policy change in February 2002. Until then, German universities 
had a weak position in terms of their rights to use the inventions of their employees. 
The “professors’ privilege” determined that professors were the only occupational 
group in Germany that had the right to use their scientific results for private 
commercialization even if the underlying research was financed by the university. 
This explains why the majority of inventions (that were taken out as patents) made in 
German universities were not assigned to universities but to the professors themselves 
or to corporations (Verspagen, 2006, Geuna and Nesta, 2006, Czarnitzki et al., 
2007a,b). 
Once derived from Article 5 of the German constitution, which pertains to the 
freedom of science and research, the German Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF) decided to abandon the professor’s privilege in 2002 because it 
was suspected to inhibit science and technology transfer (Kilger and Bartenbach, 
2002). Under the old law, the professor bore all the financial risk of filing a patent 
application (including patent application fees and potential infringement costs). As the 
distribution of the value of patents is known to be very skew university professors 
faced the risk that the costs of patenting would increase the profits thereof by far, 
which significantly decreased their incentives to patent. Under the new law, the 
university takes over the financial risk and the patent application procedure and the 
professor receives 30% of the revenues from exploiting his invention. Hence, the 
threshold for professors to patent is even reduced as the opportunity cost of patenting 
were decreased through the abolishment of the “professor’s privilege” in 2002. 
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We expect that the abolishment of the “professor’s privilege” will have two effects: 
for one, the number of patents assigned to universities is expected to increase. Second, 
we suspect a decline in quality of patents taken out by professors. As a result of the 
change in law the self selection effect into commercial activities that resulted in 
higher quality of academic patents is supposed to be significantly reduced. Hence, a 
potential decline of patent quality due to an increasing commercial orientation in 
academe is expected to be accelerated trough the change in law, i.e. after 2002. The 
investigation of the effect of the abolishment of the professors’ privilege should, 
however, be taken cautiously, since we only observe academic patents for a short 
period after the law change. Our results should be taken as indicative of the effect that 
the abolishment of the Professors’ privilege had in the short run, but should not be 
taken as a definitive evaluation.   
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
Our analysis is based on a dataset issued by the European Patent Office (EPO) and the 
OECD. The “EPO/OECD patent citations database” covers all patents applied for at 
the EPO since its foundation in 1978 and up to October 2006 as well as all patents 
applied for under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in which the EPO is 
designated, so-called “Euro-PCT applications”. In addition to detailed information on 
all cited patents, the dataset contains other information for each patent (technology 
classes, date of application and title) and each applicant and inventor (name and place 
of residence). An earlier version of this database is fully described and analyzed in 
Webb et al. (2005). 
From this database we extracted all applications involving at least one inventor 
residing in Germany, resulting in a total of 346,892 patent applications. We identified 
all patents invented by German Professors by using the persons’ title “Prof. Dr.” and 
variations of that. The professor title is protected by the German criminal code (article 
132a) against misuse by unauthorized persons. Although not compulsory, it is 
common practice in Germany to use academic titles in official communications. 
Czarnitzki et al. (2007a) did a test on the accuracy of this identification strategy for a 
sample of patents of German scientists at the German Patent and Trade Mark Office 
and the European Patent Office. They checked whether the names of professors 
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appeared in the patent database without the title but with the same address in order to 
verify that the title field is always filled in the data. The verification of a sample of 
persons had shown that university professors (or professors at other higher education 
facilities such as polytechnical colleges) can be identified by their title with high 
precision. Czarnitzki et al. (2007a) conclude that it basically never happens that 
inventor names appear sometimes with “Prof. Dr.” (or similar title) and sometimes 
without on other patents. Thus, we can safely argue that with focus on Germany this 
procedure delivers a listing of patents where professors are recorded as inventors. In 
total, we found 4,973 (granted) patents that list at least one faculty member between 
1980 and 2003. Our data turned out to contain “only” 22 university patents (i.e. 
patents owned by universities), roughly 0.45% of the total of academic patents. 
To further check the completeness of our sample of academic patents, we compared 
the outcome with a similar search in the data from the German Patent and Trademark 
Office (GPTO). More precisely, we searched all patents that have an EPO equivalent 
at the GPTO and that list professors as inventors. We found only 112 cases in which 
the GPTO patent listed a professor, but not the equivalent EPO patent over the period 
1990-2001.  
In order to evaluate the “importance” of our “academic patents”, we constructed a 
control group that include one non-academic patent for each academic patent. The 
non-academic patents were randomly drawn based on the date of applications and on 
30 patent technology classes as defined in the OST-INPI/FhG-ISI classification also 
often referred to as the Fraunhofer classification, which is based on a concordance 
with IPC assignments. For a detailed description see OECD (1994, p.77-78 for the 
definition). 
In order to ensure that no academic patent would end up in our control group, we 
deleted patents granted to non-German universities and public non-university research 
institutions4 from the pool of non-academic patents. In total, 6,758 patents were taken 
out of the pool from which the control group was drawn. 
                                                 
4 This required a manual search in all assignee names. Most prominent examples of German public 
research institutions are the Max-Planck Society, the Fraunhofer Society and the Helmholtz Society. 
However, the search was not limited to those. We excluded all public non-profit research institutions 
from the control group. 
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3.2 Variables 
We use the number of citations received by a focal patent from any subsequent patent 
application in order to establish potential differences between academic patents and 
the control group. Our purpose in this paper is to evaluate the involvement of 
academics in terms of the quality of patents. In particular, we want to know whether 
applications involving academic inventors have a stronger technological impact, and 
are therefore more frequently cited. Patent forward citations are a well established 
measure for the “importance”, the “quality” or the “significance” of a patented 
invention and have been used in different contexts in the literature on technological 
change (see Trajtenberg, 1990, Henderson et al., 1998, Harhoff et al., 1999, 
Trajtenberg, 2001, or Hall et al., 2001). Previous studies have shown that forward 
citations are highly correlated with the social value of the patented invention 
(Trajtenberg, 1990, for the computer tomography industry) as well as with its private 
value (Harhoff et al., 1999, Hall et al., 2005). Furthermore, forward citations reflect 
the economic and technological “importance” as perceived by the inventors 
themselves (Jaffe et al., 2000) and knowledgeable peers in the technology field 
(Albert et al., 1991). In this paper we use citation data from the EPO that has been 
made recently available in machine readable format by the EPO and the OECD. The 
high correlation between the number of forward citations to EPO patents with patent 
value has been documented by Gambardella et al. (2008). Hence, we can safely argue 
that forward citations reflect the “importance” of the cited patent. 
Previous U.S. studies on patent citations paid particular attention to “self-citations”, 
i.e. cited and citing patents are owned by the same entity (e.g. Jaffe et al., 1993, Jaffe 
and Trajtenberg, 2002). Self-citations differ from external citations in that they cannot 
be regarded as representing spillovers to another patentee, they might be affected by 
the patentee’s differential knowledge and they might provide different signals than 
other citations regarding the value to the patentee with respect to future cumulative 
inventions (Hall et al., 2005). Contrary to the well-known “NBER Patent Database”, 
the “EPO/OECD patent citations database” does not indicate self-citations. Hence, we 
cannot control for them. However, we do not expect any significant impact on the 
results from self-citations for two reasons. First, previous studies have found little 
effects from the exclusion of self-citation on forward citations in different contexts. 
Hall et al. (2005), for instance, found a real but limited effect of the exclusion of self-
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citation on the relationship between forward citations and the market value of firms 
for U.S. patents (see also Hall et al., 2007). For Europe, Sapsalis and Van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) found that removing self-citations does not affect 
the relationship between forward citations and the explanatory variables for EPO 
patents of Belgian universities. Second, unlike at the USPTO, patent applicants at the 
EPO do not have the “duty of candor”, which means that there is no legal requirement 
to disclose prior art. In order to check whether an EPO patent application fulfills the 
necessary criteria to be granted, a patent examiner researches prior. The results of this 
investigation are summarized in the so-called “search report”. Descriptive statistics 
show that more than 95% of the citations in EPO patents are added by the examiner. 
In contrast, USPTO applicants have to provide a full list of prior art, including their 
own work. This suggests that the “self-bias” in EPO patents is presumably very low 
and would carry a weak informational content. The fact that the allocation of citations 
follows a standardized procedure at the EPO is likely to reduce the noise contained in 
the forward citations as a measure of the “importance” of patents.  
Turning to the explanatory variables of our analysis, our main variable is a binary 
indicator that takes the value 1 if the inventor is an academic (see description in 
section 3.1). We will test whether patents that involve academic inventors are more 
“important” than those of the controls. 
Following the literature on patent quality, intrinsic attributes of the patent that may 
lead to a higher expected count of forward citations need to be controlled for. 
Consequently, we include the following control variables: 
Number of references to the patent literature (backward citations): The search report 
published by the EPO yields information on the state of the art relevant for a given 
patent application. Backward citations determine the legal boundaries of an invention 
by citing a related body of work. Thus, one could hypothesize that applications 
containing references to a large number of related inventions are of more incremental 
nature (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). However, empirical evidence tends to 
uncover a positive effect of backward citations on the value of a patent (Harhoff et al., 
2003), which suggests that the number of cited patent is more likely to refer to the 
crowdedness of the technological area (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). Everything 
else equal, patents in more crowded areas should generate more forward citations. An 
alternative interpretation is that backward citations are a measure of the scope of the 
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patents. Since patent citations always refer to a claim (or a set of claims), patents with 
more backward citations should be more cited, everything else equal (Harhoff et al., 
2003).  
Patent scope: Following Lerner (1994), we use the number of international patent 
classes (IPC), at the 4-digit level, assigned to the patent as a measure of patent scope. 
The number of IPC assignments is a proxy for the extent of monopoly power a patent 
grants. Thus the broader the scope of a patent, the higher the probability to be cited by 
other patents. 
References to the non-patent literature: We include a binary variable that takes the 
value 1 if the patent application cites at least one non-patent reference (NPR). We 
hypothesize that NPRs capture the invention’s science linkage. This measure should 
be taken cautiously, since NPRs do not necessarily represent a linkage to prior 
scientific work (Harhoff et al., 2003).5 However, Callaert et al. (2004) show that 
roughly 65% of NPRs in EPO patents refer to scientific publications and there is some 
recognition of their use as an indicator of science-technology linkages (Meyer, 2000, 
Schmoch, 1997). 
Finally, we control for systematic year and technology effects by including dummies 
for application years and technology fields (see below). 
3.3 Descriptive analysis 
3.3.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. These 
figures show that academic patents receive, on average, more citations than the 
control group and have more NPRs. In addition, academic patents appear to be 
broader, as measured by the number of IPC assignments and to be in less crowded 
technology fields as indicated by the number of backward citations. 
                                                 
5 Non-patent references can also be made to trade journals, firm publications or standard classifications 
in a technology field as classifications of chemical substances or mechanical designs. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Academic patents Control group 
  Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Number of forward citations 2.702 3.792 0 58 2.242 3.122 0 48 
Number of IPC assignments 1.663 0.861 1 11 1.556 0.770 1 8 
Non-patent references 0.364 0.481 0 1 0.245 0.430 0 1 
Number of backward citations 3.700 2.370 0 19 3.909 2.230 0 18 
Number of observations 4,973 4,973 
Table 2 tabulates the number of academic patents in each of the technology areas 
from the OST classification. The Table shows that most academic patents are granted 
in chemicals and pharmaceuticals, which contains more than 40% of all academic 
patents, notably in the field of organic fine chemicals.  
3.3.2 Citation lags 
Forward citations are by nature truncated, since earlier patents have more time to 
garner citations than later ones (Hall et al., 2001). Sampat et al. (2003) compare 
university and corporate patents in the U.S. and find that the resulting difference in 
citation counts is sensitive to the length of the time period taken into account. They 
argue that citations to universities occur on average later than citations to the controls. 
We test the hypothesis of different citation lags between academic patents and the 
control group by plotting the kernel density of the citation lag distribution for both 
groups. Figure 2 reveals that there are no systematic differences between academic 
patents and the controls. Moreover, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject 
equality of the citation lag distributions (p-value: 0.678). Hence, we can safely argue 
that our empirical findings are not driven by systematic differences in citation lags for 
academic and control patents. 
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Table 2: Technology classification of academic patents 
   Total    
Field OST technology class academic patents % of total 
 I  Electricity – Electronics 390 7.8 
1 Electrical devices - electrical engineering 168   
2 Audiovisual technology 49   
3 Telecommunications 103   
4 Information technology 37   
5 Semiconductors  33   
  II Instruments 882 17.7 
6 Optics 87   
7 Analysis, measurement, control 377   
8 Medical engineering 418   
  III Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 2153 43.3 
9 Organic fine chemicals 997   
10 Macromolecular chemistry, polymers 201   
11 Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics 323   
12 Biotechnology 296   
13 Materials, metallurgy 288   
14 Agriculture, food 48   
  IV Process engineering 829 16.7 
15 General technological processes 45   
16 Surfaces, coatings 130   
17 Material processing 201   
18 Thermal techniques 88   
19 Basic chemical processing, petrol 193   
20 Environment, pollution 172   
  V Mechanical engineering 565 11.4 
21 Mechanical tools 119   
22 Engines, pumps, turbines 64   
23 Mechanical elements 136   
24 Handling, printing 68   
25 Agriculture & food machinery 34   
26 Transport 105   
27 Nuclear engineering 23   
28 Space technology, weapons 16   
  VI Other  154 3.1 
29 Consumer goods & equipment 61   
30 Civil engineering, building, mining 92   
99 Misc or unclassified 1   
  Total 4973 100.0 
 
The finding that there is no significant difference in citation lags for European patents 
might be due to different procedures at the EPO and USPTO. As pointed out in 
section 3.2 already, contrary to practices at the USPTO, inventors applying for an 
EPO patent do not have the “duty of candor” and are not required to provide a list of 
prior art. The patent application is examined by the patent office and even references 
made by the applicant have to be approved by the patent examiner. Bacchiocchi and 
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Montobbio (2004) find that these institutional differences imply that USPTO patents 
contain on average more citations than EPO patents and that the median citation lag is 
twice as large at the USPTO than at the EPO.  
Figure 3: Citation lags of academic patents and controls 
 
 
3.4 Methodology 
Since our variable of interest, the number of forward citations contains only positive 
integers, we use count models. The specification of our baseline regression follows a 
well established literature in the area (see for example Henderson et al., 1998 or 
Mowery et al., 2002). More specifically, we estimate negative binomial and Poisson 
models with conditional mean: 
[ ]| exp log( )t t c c i i
t c i
E C X T ACAD APY TECH Z Tβ α λ δ ε⎡ ⎤= + + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑  ,   (1) 
where C is the number of forward citations to the focal patent and X is the vector of 
explanatory variables containing: ACAD, a dummy that equals 1 for all academic 
patents in our sample; APY, a set of dummy variables for different patent application 
years t, and TECH, a set of dummy variables for the different technology classes c a 
patent application is attributed to. In addition, the vector Z contains the control 
variables outlined in Section 3.2. The dependent variable, the number of forward 
citations, is truncated since later patents have less time to garner citations than earlier 
ones, which is why we estimate the model with “exposure” (Cameron and Trivedi, 
1998). The variable T is the age of the patent in 2006 (the last year recorded in our 
data) since its publication, or exposure during which citations occur. Thus, the natural 
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log of T enters as an offset in the conditional mean. The Poisson model is estimated 
by Quasi-Maximum Likelihood, since estimates of this model will be consistent, 
provided the mean is correctly specified, even if the true distribution is not Poisson 
(Gouriéroux et al., 1984). However, it is possible to improve efficiency by making 
more restrictive assumptions about the way the variance differs from the mean, which 
is why we also report results of Negative Binomial regressions.  
Two robustness checks are reported in the Appendix. First, we repeat all regressions 
using only those academic patents that involve corporate assignees. We also repeat all 
regressions using all academic patent applications (instead of granted patents only). 
This enables us to verify that our data is not affected by the end of the sample 
truncation in patent grants. Sampat et al. (2003) show that U.S. university patents are 
on average granted later than corporate patents. Since the results of the estimations in 
which we use all patent applications go into the same direction as the results from our 
baseline sample, we argue that this problem is not severe for European patents. 
4 Results 
4.1 Are academic patents more “important” than corporate patents? 
Table 3 displays the results of the Negative Binomial and Poisson regressions for 
equation (1). Confirming our findings on the comparison of means, patents involving 
an academic inventor have a higher technological impact. According to the Negative 
Binomial regression results, academic patents receive on average about 17% 
(=exp(0.161)-1) more citations than their counterparts in the control group. This 
confirms our first hypothesis that academics are involved in more valuable inventions. 
This suggests that university patenting per se is not the only channel through which 
academics can generate knowledge externalities. Overall, the results support our 
assumption that academic patents are, on average, more “important” than purely 
corporate patents. 
With respect to the control variables, our results show that, everything else equal, 
applications with more backward citations receive, on average, more citations. In the 
same way, broader applications, as measured by the number of IPC assignments (at 
the 4-digit level), show a higher expected citations count. Finally, NPRs do not 
exhibit a higher citation impact in the Poisson model, but turn out to be positively and 
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significantly related to the number of citations received in the Negative Binomial 
model. 
Table 3: QMLE Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions for patent forward citations: 
academics patents versus controls  
  QMLE Poisson Negative Binomial 
Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
ACAD 0.169 *** 0.027 0.161 *** 0.024 
# backward citations 0.046 *** 0.006 0.049 *** 0.006 
NPR 0.048  0.034 0.057 ** 0.029 
# IPC assignments 0.128 *** 0.018 0.135 *** 0.016 
log(T) 1  1  
Constant -4.403 *** 0.335 -4.429 *** 0.432 
App. years – test of joint significance χ2(23)=201.99*** χ2(23)=252.23*** 
Tech. Classes – test of joint significance χ2(30)=358.10*** χ2(30)=365.25*** 
Overdispersion parameter     0.968 0.022 
LR test of equidispersion (p-value)     0.000 
Log-likelihood -25393.463 -19957.302 
4.2 Are academic patents more “important” in the upper tail of the quality 
distribution of inventions? 
In order to test our second hypothesis we estimate quantile regressions. For simplicity 
we use a log-linear specification instead of count models, where the dependent 
variable is the log of (one plus) the number of forward citations. Figure 4 displays the 
results. The solid curve represents the coefficient of the quantile regression, the 
shaded area indicates the confidence interval of this regression and the dotted lines the 
OLS coefficient and the corresponding confidence interval. The results are only 
shown from the 50th quantile since there are more than 30% of patents with no 
citation, so that the coefficient for the academic dummy would always be zero at 
lower quantiles. 
We find that, academic patents have a quite uniform effect over the whole range of 
the distribution. Thus, the quantile regressions are quite consistent with the OLS 
results, since their coefficient is always contained in the OLS confidence interval. 
Therefore, we do not confirm our second hypothesis. The results suggest that 
academics are not more likely to be found in the upper tail of the quality distribution 
of patented inventions. 
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Figure 4: Quantile regression results 
 
 
4.3 Did the “quality” of academic patents decline over time? 
Given the changing conditions for academics in terms of research agendas, funding 
sources, as well as legal structures, we test whether the “quality” of academic patents 
has evolved over time. To do so, we repeat the baseline regression by interacting the 
application years with the “academic patent” dummy. The estimated model becomes: 
[ ]|
        exp ( * ) log( )t t t t c c i i
t t c i
E C X T
ACAD APY APY TECH Z Tγ α λ δ ε
=
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 (2) 
The results are reported in Table 4. The signs and magnitude of the interaction terms 
suggest that the quality of academic and corporate patents tends to converge over 
time, which supports our hypothesis 3 of greater pressure put on faculty members to 
patent, leading to academic patents of lower “importance”. The results reveal a 
decreasing trend in academic patent quality, even without a Bayh-Dole act type of 
legislation. 
Interestingly, the interaction terms of application years and the academic inventor 
dummy becomes negative and significant after 2001, which corresponds to the period 
of the abolishment of the “professor privilege”. These preliminary estimations suggest 
that the law change has accelerated the decline in “importance” of academic patents, 
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 fo
r '
A
C
A
D
'
50 60 70 80 90
Quantile
  24
confirming hypothesis 4; however, we are not able to assess the long-term impact of 
this policy change for two reasons. First, in order to effectively assess the effect of 
this new measure, we would need to perform the analysis using a longer time window 
of the citations. The current result only includes data for two years after the policy 
change entered into play and we only have three years of citations data for the latest 
period in our sample. Second, it is not clear whether universities already started to 
enforce this policy since we only observe four patents granted to universities in the 
post 2002 period. The present results are therefore only indicative of a negative 
relationship in the short run. Moreover, as demonstrated by Mowery et al. (2003), 
universities (and academics) can learn to patent, through experience in patenting and 
therefore our results might well be different in the long run, once universities start to 
enforce the new policy by claiming ownership of the patents and establishing efficient 
technology transfer offices, which does not seem to be the case so far.  
Table 4: QMLE Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions for patent forward citations: the 
“importance” of academic patents over time 
 Poisson QMLE Negative Binomial 
Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
1980-1983*ACAD 0.248 *** 0.066 0.264 *** 0.060 
1984-1987*ACAD 0.159 *** 0.056 0.164 *** 0.050 
1988-1991*ACAD 0.151 *** 0.052 0.159 *** 0.049 
1992-1995*ACAD 0.271 *** 0.061 0.282 *** 0.056 
1996-1998*ACAD 0.037  0.080 0.031  0.072 
1999-2001*ACAD -0.116  0.150 -0.094  0.096 
2002-2003*ACAD -1.004 *** 0.341 -0.987 *** 0.284 
# backward citations 0.046 *** 0.006 0.049 *** 0.006 
NPR 0.048  0.035 0.057 ** 0.029 
# IPC assignments 0.127 *** 0.018 0.134 *** 0.015 
log(T) 1  1  
Constant -2.766 *** 0.089 -2.816 *** 0.086 
App. years – test of joint significance χ2(6)=106.93*** χ2(6)=135.38*** 
Tech. Classes – test of joint significance χ2(30)=366.91*** χ2(30)=362.68*** 
Overdispersion parameter     0.968 0.022 
LR test of equidispersion (p-value)     0.000 
Log-likelihood -25408.794 -19958.754 
 
4.4 Is the decline driven by academic entry? 
Mowery et al. (2006) find that in the U.S., inexperienced universities initially adopted 
an indiscriminate policy toward patenting as they entered into this activity after 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act and patented inventions with little evaluation of the 
market within their industry. Furthermore, they find that the decline quality of 
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university patents in the U.S. is largely due to these academic entrants. In order to 
complement our previous findings we test whether the decline in the quality of faculty 
patents can be attributed to academics with no historical experience in patenting. 
The estimated model becomes: 
  
[ ]| [exp ( * _ ) ( * _ )
                    log( ) ],
t t t t
t t
t t c c i i
t c i
E C X T APY ACAD INCUM APY ACAD ENT
APY TECH Z T
γ ω
α λ δ ε
= +
+ + + + +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ (3) 
where ACAD_ENT equals 1 for all entrant faculty members and 0 for all incumbent 
Faculty inventors and the control group. Entrants are defined as academic inventors 
who have never patented before the focal patent. Similarly, ACAD_INCUM stands for 
academic incumbents, who are faculty members that have at least patented once 
before the focal patent. For a given time period t, exp(ω) will be indicative of the 
quality of patents issued to academic entrants relative to those granted to the control 
group. Similarly, the comparison of ω and γ will measure the difference in quality 
between academic entrants and academic incumbents.  
In the previous section, we identified three periods: the period 1980-1995, in which 
the academic patents were more important than those of the controls; the period 1996-
2001, where this relationship became insignificant, and the period 2002-2003, after 
the abolishment of the professor privilege, where the relationship became negative. 
We are going to use these three time windows in order to identify whether entry of 
new academic inventors played a role in this apparent decline in quality of academic 
patents.  
The results in Table 5 suggest that academic entrants performed better than the 
controls until 1995. The relationship becomes negative in the 1996-2001 period. The 
negative effect is even stronger in the post 2001 period (after the abolishment of the 
professors’ privilege).   
The results of formal tests for the relative performance of academic entrants and 
incumbents are presented in Table 6. One-sided χ2-tests for the null hypothesis γω ≥  
reveal that academic entrants always performed worse than incumbents. However, our 
previous finding on the decline in quality still holds for academic incumbents, even 
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when controlling for academic entry. This suggests that academic entrants are not 
causing the decline but that seems to be more secular. 
Table 5: Estimation results (3) 
 Poisson QMLE Negative Binomial 
Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
1980-1995*ACAD_ENT 0.161 *** 0.039 0.178 *** 0.035 
1996-2001*ACAD_ENT -0.102  0.093 -0.115  0.076 
2001-2003*ACAD_ENT -1.399 *** 0.418 -1.371 *** 0.415 
1980-1995*ACAD_INCUM 0.221 *** 0.034 0.233 *** 0.032 
1996-2001*ACAD_INCUM 0.050  0.082 0.051  0.067 
2001-2003*ACAD_INCUM -0.709 * 0.386 -0.696 ** 0.340 
# backward citations 0.045 *** 0.005 0.049 *** 0.006 
NPR 0.066 * 0.035 0.072 ** 0.029 
# IPC assignments 0.120 *** 0.019 0.131 *** 0.015 
log(T) 1   1  
Constant -2.452 *** 0.081 -2.464 *** 0.076 
App. years – test of joint significance χ2(2)=38.91*** χ2(2)=50.01*** 
Tech. Classes – test of joint significance χ 2(30)=365.54*** χ2(30)=357.39*** 
Overdispersion parameter     0.998 0.026 
LR test of equidispersion (p-value)     0.000 
Log-likelihood -25345.270 -20040.445 
 
Table 6: Test of γω ≥  
 P-value of one-sided χ2-test  
  Poisson QMLE Negative Binomial 
1980-1995 0.080 0.081 
1996-2001 0.065 0.023 
2002-2003 0.057 0.080 
 
5 Conclusion 
As a major source of knowledge creation the public science sector and universities in 
particular have attracted considerable attention by policy makers and economic 
scholars in the recent past. Their main interest is to access the full potential of science 
and knowledge produces at universities (and other public science institutions) and to 
identify and facilitate effective ways to improve exploitation of these inventions for 
the benefit of the economy. In consequence, recent policy endeavors aimed at 
enhancing knowledge transfer from science to industry. Most prominent and also 
most significant actions taken by governments of industrialized countries were Bayh-
Dole act type of legislation changes to strengthen universities’ patenting rights.  
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Addressing the importance of university inventions as opposed to business inventions 
previous studies focused on patents as a way to make inventions and their importance 
(in terms of citations they receive) visible. It is found that university patents 
outperform patents in the business sector in terms of citations they receive (e.g. 
Henderson et al., 1998). Not all inventions by university professors are, however, 
patented through the university (Thursby et al., 2007). The present paper takes an 
initial step in focusing on the whole landscape of inventions taken out by academic 
scientists independent of assigneeship on patent documents. By comparing patents 
with at least one academic on the inventor list to a control group of pure business 
patents we find that academic involvement in patenting results in greater knowledge 
externalities as measured by forward citations. Hence, our results confirm the findings 
by previous studies that focus on university patents only. However, our analysis also 
suggests that the contribution of academics is underestimated if only patents assigned 
to universities are taken into account. Indeed, a major channel of knowledge transfer 
from science to business takes place through consulting and other forms of 
collaborative research in between academics and firms that become visible in co-
invented patents assigned to the private sector. Taking these patents into account is 
especially important for Europe where Bayh-Dole act type of legislations took place 
only recently in many countries, which implies that universities claim the right on 
academics’ inventions only in recent years. 
Further, we find that in the European context of changing public sector research 
environments and increasingly competitive funding sources, the “importance” of 
academic patents declines over time since the mid-90’s. This is partly due to 
inexperienced academics that engage in patenting without any thorough evaluation of 
the relevant market as is suggested by the low number of citations their patents 
receive. However, also the relative importance of patents involving experienced 
academics declined over time. Hence, the quality of corporate and academic patents 
converge and in the most recent period in our data, academic quality even falls behind 
corporate quality. This last period corresponds to the introduction of a Bayh-Dole-
type policy in Germany, which suggests that this legal disposition led to an 
acceleration of the patent quality decline. The latter result has to be taken with caution 
though as it only maps the effects in the immediate years after the abolishment of the 
professors’ privilege and might be a transitory effect.  
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These results have some interesting implications. In showing that academic and 
business patents converge over the past decades in terms of importance we find a 
similar pattern as has been found for the U.S. (e.g. Henderson et al., 1998). The 
relative quality decline of university patents in the U.S. is typically attributed at least 
in part to the Bayh-Dole act that led university to increased patenting, though. The 
fact that we observe the same development for Germany, where the “German Bayh-
Dole act” took only place recently, suggests, however, that the convergence between 
academic and business patents is rather attributable to a reorientation of the public 
science sector towards marketable research projects, funding sources in the private 
sector and through industry-science collaborations. 
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Appendix 
In this Appendix we report robustness checks for the results found in the text, using 
alternative sample specifications. 
A. Academic patents with corporate assignees. 
In this Section, we repeat all regressions made in the text using only those academic 
patents with corporate assignees. The construction of the control group follows the 
strategy described in Section 3. Descriptive statistics for the new sample are provided 
in Table 1a. 
Table 1a: Descriptive statistics 
 Academic patents Control group 
  Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Number of forward citations 2.754 3.925 0 58 2.228 3.108 0 48 
Number of IPC assignments 1.675 0.846 1 11 1.576 0.778 1 8 
Non-patent references 0.368 0.482 0 1 0.260 0.438 0 1 
Number of backward citations 3.591 2.311 0 19 3.821 2.238 0 18 
Number of observations 3,901 3,901 
 
Table 2a repeats the regression made in Table 2. The results are consistent with those 
discussed in the text and the coefficient for the academic dummy is close to the one 
previously found. 
Table 2a: QMLE Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions for patent forward citations: 
academics patents versus controls  
  QMLE Poisson Negative Binomial 
Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
ACAD 0.190 *** 0.030 0.187 *** 0.027 
# backward citations 0.043 *** 0.006 0.047 *** 0.006 
NPR 0.043  0.039 0.055 * 0.032 
# IPC assignments 0.134 *** 0.020 0.144 *** 0.018 
log(T) 1  1  
Constant -2.818 *** 0.125 -2.874 *** 0.114 
App. years – test of joint significance χ2(23)=149.02*** χ2(23)=194.12*** 
Tech. Classes – test of joint significance χ2(30)=294.62*** χ2(30)=303.31*** 
Overdispersion parameter     0.988 0.025 
LR test of equidispersion (p-value)     0.000 
Log-likelihood -20129.568 -15675.812 
 
Table 4a repeats the regression from Table 4 by interacting the academic dummy with 
year dummies. The results are again consistent with those from our baseline sample 
and exhibit the same trend.  
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Table 4a: QMLE Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions for patent forward citations: the 
“importance” of academic patents over time 
 Poisson QMLE Negative Binomial 
Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
1980-1983*ACAD 0.307 *** 0.078 0.324 *** 0.069 
1984-1987*ACAD 0.143 ** 0.064 0.153 *** 0.057 
1988-1991*ACAD 0.148 *** 0.058 0.159 *** 0.055 
1992-1995*ACAD 0.310 *** 0.068 0.319 *** 0.063 
1996-1998*ACAD 0.088  0.095 0.083  0.085 
1999-2001*ACAD -0.020  0.168 -0.007  0.114 
2002-2003*ACAD -0.931 ** 0.374 -0.996 *** 0.308 
# backward citations 0.043 *** 0.006 0.047 *** 0.006 
NPR 0.046  0.039 0.057 * 0.032 
# IPC assignments 0.133 *** 0.021 0.142 *** 0.018 
log(T) 1  1  
Constant -2.804 *** 0.101 -2.861 *** 0.076 
App. years – test of joint significance χ2(6)=79.31*** χ2(6)=104.13*** 
Tech. Classes – test of joint significance χ2(30)=298.95*** χ2(30)=301.97*** 
Overdispersion parameter     0.988 0.025 
LR test of equidispersion (p-value)     0.000 
Log-likelihood -20131.941 -15675.261 
 
The quantile regression gives identical results as the ones found in the text, as the 
coefficient for the academic dummy remains within the boundaries of the OLS 
confidence interval. 
Figure 3a: Quantile regression 
 
 
Finally, the estimation that interacts application years with academic entrants and 
incumbents supports the results found in the text. 
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Table 5a: Estimation results (3) 
 Poisson QMLE Negative Binomial 
Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
1980-1995*ACAD_ENT 0.196 *** 0.045 0.213 *** 0.041 
1996-2001*ACAD_ENT -0.027  0.113 -0.056  0.092 
2001-2003*ACAD_ENT -1.263 *** 0.454 -1.206 *** 0.454 
1980-1995*ACAD_INCUM 0.219 *** 0.038 0.236 *** 0.036 
1996-2001*ACAD_INCUM 0.099  0.094 0.109  0.077 
2001-2003*ACAD_INCUM -0.719 * 0.419 -0.689 ** 0.362 
# backward citations 0.044 *** 0.006 0.049 *** 0.006 
NPR 0.069 * 0.039 0.075 ** 0.033 
# IPC assignments 0.126 *** 0.021 0.139 *** 0.018 
log(T) 1   1  
Constant -2.485 *** 0.090 -2.507 *** 0.085 
App. years – test of joint significance χ2(2)=27.47*** χ2(2)=33.32*** 
Tech. Classes – test of joint significance χ 2(30)=288.21*** χ2(30)=283.91*** 
Overdispersion parameter     1.019 0.026 
LR test of equidispersion (p-value)     0.000 
Log-likelihood -20387.441 -15743.745 
 
B. All patent applications. 
In this Section, we repeat all regressions made in the text using all patent applications 
instead of the granted ones only, and by constructing an adequate control group as 
before. Descriptive statistics for the new sample are provided in Table 1b. 
Table 1b: Descriptive statistics 
 Academic patents Control group 
  Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Number of forward citations 2.128 3.284 0 58 1.861 2.728 0 48 
Number of IPC assignments 1.681 0.882 1 11 1.590 0.818 1 8 
Non-patent references 0.378 0.485 0 1 0.184 0.388 0 1 
Number of backward citations 3.646 2.457 0 21 3.941 2.359 0 23 
Number of observations 8,396 3,977 
 
Table 2b shows that the coefficient on the academic dummy is slightly lower, as can 
be expected, when we take all applications into account. However, the effect is still 
positive and significant. 
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Table 2b: QMLE Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions for patent forward citations: 
academics patents versus controls  
  QMLE Poisson Negative Binomial 
Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
ACAD 0.120 *** 0.022 0.111 *** 0.021 
# backward citations 0.046 *** 0.004 0.048 *** 0.005 
NPR 0.039  0.027 0.022  0.024 
# IPC assignments 0.112 *** 0.014 0.123 *** 0.013 
log(T) 1  1  
Constant -2.884 *** 0.088 -2.921 *** 0.087 
App. years – test of joint significance χ2(23)=290.75*** χ2(23)=344.30*** 
Tech. Classes – test of joint significance χ2(30)=431.75*** χ2(30)=473.84*** 
Overdispersion parameter     1.053 0.087 
LR test of equidispersion (p-value)     0.000 
Log-likelihood -37756.242 -30214.231 
 
The quantile regression gives the same results as before, i.e., the academic dummy 
remains within the boundaries of the OLS confidence interval. 
Figure 3b: Quantile regression 
 
 
Table 4b is consistent with our previous results in showing the decline of the quality 
of academic patents over time. 
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Table 4b: QMLE Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions for patent forward citations: the 
“importance” of academic patents over time 
 Poisson QMLE Negative Binomial 
Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
1980-1983*ACAD 0.262 *** 0.059 0.276 *** 0.056 
1984-1987*ACAD 0.099 ** 0.046 0.112 *** 0.044 
1988-1991*ACAD 0.113 *** 0.044 0.121 *** 0.041 
1992-1995*ACAD 0.169 *** 0.051 0.183 *** 0.048 
1996-1998*ACAD 0.061  0.064 0.073  0.057 
1999-2001*ACAD -0.112  0.086 -0.092  0.054 
2002-2003*ACAD -0.609 ** 0.084 -0.580 *** 0.149 
# backward citations 0.045 *** 0.004 0.048 *** 0.004 
NPR 0.046 * 0.027 0.028  0.024 
# IPC assignments 0.110 *** 0.014 0.121 *** 0.013 
log(T) 1  1  
Constant -2.868 *** 0.073 -2.911 *** 0.072 
App. years – test of joint significance χ2(6)=121.19*** χ2(6)=149.35*** 
Tech. Classes – test of joint significance χ2(30)=433.57*** χ2(30)=471.70*** 
Overdispersion parameter     1.055 0.020 
LR test of equidispersion (p-value)     0.000 
Log-likelihood -37785.295 -30230.821 
Finally, the results reported in Table 5b confirm our previous findings concerning the 
decline of quality for academic entrants and incumbents. 
Table 5b: Estimation results (3) 
 Poisson QMLE Negative Binomial 
Variables Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
1980-1995*ACAD_ENT 0.126 *** 0.033 0.143 *** 0.031 
1996-2001*ACAD_ENT -0.099  0.066 -0.087  0.055 
2001-2003*ACAD_ENT -0.901 *** 0.228 -0.874 *** 0.198 
1980-1995*ACAD_INCUM 0.163 *** 0.029 0.168 *** 0.028 
1996-2001*ACAD_INCUM 0.063  0.060 0.067  0.050 
2001-2003*ACAD_INCUM -0.336  0.219 -0.303 * 0.181 
# backward citations 0.045 *** 0.004 0.048 *** 0.004 
NPR 0.053 * 0.027 0.033  0.025 
# IPC assignments 0.105 *** 0.014 0.118 *** 0.013 
log(T) 1   1  
Constant -2.580 *** 0.060 -2.588 *** 0.062 
App. years – test of joint significance χ2(2)=9.04*** χ2(2)=56.26*** 
Tech. Classes – test of joint significance χ 2(30)=428.06*** Χ2(30)=460.94*** 
Overdispersion parameter     1.076 0.020 
LR test of equidispersion (p-value)     0.000 
Log-likelihood -38056.274 -30310.459 
 
